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ANALYSIS
Calculus of Dissent: How the Kremlin is Countering its Rivals
By Vladimir Gel'man, Helsinki
Abstract
The murder of Boris Nemtsov on 27 February 2015 dealt an enormous blow to the Russian opposition. 
Regardless of whether the Kremlin was responsible, the assassination marked a turning point in its pol-
icy toward its rivals. In essence, the brutal and conspicuous political violence against one of the Kremlin’s 
most visible critics just two days before scheduled major anti-regime rallies was a clear sign that the regime 
had adopted a strategy for increasing the use of coercion vis-à-vis organized political dissent in Russia. This 
article examines why these tendencies recently began to dominate Russia’s political landscape and what to 
expect for the future.
From Cooptation to Coercion
Russia’s authoritarian regime is hardly unique. In the 
face of increasing resistance from the opposition, many 
dictatorships adopt measures to contain their detractors. 
The menu of authoritarian strategies includes coopt-
ing real and potential rivals, the use of propaganda for 
discrediting critics, and the politics of fear, which may 
include varieties of coercion or threats to use it. These 
strategies address both opposition activists and potential 
supporters, who do not agree with government policy, 
but see anti-regime activities as a costly venture. In the 
case of cooptation, regime critics may ultimately benefit 
from their conversion to loyalty; in the case of coercion, 
the price of disloyalty may be high (as Nemtsov’s tragic 
murder ostensibly demonstrated). Indeed, not all author-
itarian regimes are blatantly bloody: for a number of rea-
sons, some dictators tend to use coercion as an option 
of last resort. Up until now, Russia also fit this category.
The late-Soviet practice of political control, which 
in many ways serves as a role model for Russia’s cur-
rent leadership, was not overly repressive by interna-
tional standards. The Soviet coercive apparatus preferred 
to rely upon “preventive work” (profilakticheskaya rab-
ota), which included monitoring disloyal citizens and 
intimidating them: the risk of being punished for open 
anti-regime activism was perceived as high, so it was 
no wonder that most people limited their disloyalty to 
kitchen conversations. Under these conditions, the nar-
row milieu of devoted dissidents found it hard to broaden 
their ranks, despite a large number of sympathizers. At 
the same time, the regime used a wide range of “active 
measures” (aktivnye meropriyatiya) to punish its loud-
est and most dangerous rivals: even though the number 
of political prisoners in the late-Soviet period was rela-
tively low, coercive techniques, ranging from job loss to 
forced emigration, were pervasive. Thus, Soviet citizens 
received clear signals that being involved in organized 
dissent would lead to trouble, and largely abstained from 
it, until the period of perestroika. To some extent, post-
Soviet rulers learned some lessons from this experience.
The decline of the political opposition of various col-
ors during the 2000s made the task of containing orga-
nized political dissent in Russia relatively easy for the 
Kremlin. Even though the threat of importing “color 
revolutions” to Russia was widely exaggerated by pro-
regime loyalists, the strategy of preemptive counterrev-
olution bore fruit for the Russian leadership. On the 
one hand, the Kremlin used various carrots, seeking to 
incorporate moderate critics into loyalist systemic par-
ties (such as Just Russia), state-supported NGOs and 
other regime-driven projects. On the other hand, the 
regime wielded sticks by toughening its regulation of 
rallies and meetings, pressuring irreconcilable oppo-
nents, and deploying divide-and-rule tactics. When the 
opposition was driven into a nearly hopeless political 
ghetto, its public support dropped to negligible levels, 
and its noisy events, at best, brought together hundreds 
of irrelevant freaks.
Ultimately, the preference for cooptation over 
actual coercion served to bolster the Kremlin’s domi-
nance. However, this strategy was short-sighted. The 
growing demand for political changes, which occurred 
during Medvedev’s presidency, greatly contributed to 
the post-election protests of 2011–2012, and raised 
questions about the effectiveness of the previous 
strategy.
In the wake of 2011–2012 “rebellion,” the Kremlin 
faced several new challenges. Not only did the opposi-
tion renew its ranks and experience an inflow of activists 
from the post-Soviet generation, but leaders who were 
about 40 years old, ranging from Alexei Navalny and 
Sergei Udaltsov to Vladimir Milov, came to the fore-
front. Moreover, some new organizational forms and 
techniques, such as crowdfunding and social media plat-
forms used as mechanisms for coordinating anti-regime 
activism, at least partly compensated for the shortage 
of resources and the lack of organizational capabili-
ties among the Kremlin’s rivals. Thus, the wave of pro-
tests became a wake-up call for the Kremlin: the day 
after the presidential elections in March 2012, Vladi-
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mir Putin announced a “tightening of the screws” vis-
à-vis the opposition. Over the next three years, he kept 
this promise.
The turning point occurred on 6 May 2012, when 
some protest rally participants in Moscow clashed with 
the police. More than two dozen attendees (not all of 
whom were activists) were accused of breaking the law 
and imprisoned; some activists left the country. The 
random nature of the arrests served the goals of intim-
idating a broad pool of opposition supporters and citi-
zens who might have become supporters if it were not 
so dangerous. Also, claims that members of the oppo-
sition beat the police and engaged in other disruptive 
actions legitimized the tendency to adopt increasingly 
repressive legal norms, which gave the law enforcement 
agencies broad discretion and allowed arbitrary imple-
mentation. In 2012–13, the Kremlin pursued several 
legislative initiatives aimed to deter opposition activ-
ities, including:
• The “foreign agents law,” which required Russian 
NGOs with funding from abroad to register as “for-
eign agents” if they performed “political functions.” 
This term was formulated deliberately vaguely and 
often applied to any form of organized civil and 
social activism. The media portrayed the targets as 
members of a “fifth column” or “national traitors.” 
The latest version of the law allows law enforcement 
agencies to label any NGO as a “foreign agent,” even 
without a court’s decision.
• New regulations on Internet use, which allows state 
officials unilaterally to block websites and social 
media applications for numerous real or imagined 
transgressions—again, even without a court order 
(this clause was applied against opposition-leaning 
websites, such as grani.ru and ej.ru, which criticized 
the Russian annexation of Crimea);
• Amendments to the criminal code making defama-
tion in the media a crime (previously, under Med-
vedev, these issues were qualified as matters of civil 
rather than criminal procedure);
• Amendments to rules on financial transactions, 
which limited the size of anonymous financial dona-
tions and the quantity of financial transactions by 
individuals (with the pretext of combatting terror-
ism); and
• The broadening of regulations with regard to 
combating various forms of “extremism,” includ-
ing “insulting religious feelings” and “separat-
ist claims”: not only has the legal definition of 
these practices been made vague, but also pun-
ishment for violations of these norms has become 
more severe, including not only fines, but also 
incarceration.
“Tightening the screws”
The post-2012 combination of stricter regulations and 
more arbitrary implementation in Russia contributed to 
the consistent and wide-ranging politics of fear, which 
targeted not only journalists, bloggers and civic activists 
(who were perceived by the Kremlin as real and poten-
tial members of the opposition), but also some academ-
ics, such as former rector of the New Economic School 
Sergei Guriev, who fled to Paris after being interrogated 
by prosecutors, or Professor Mikhail Savva from Krasn-
odar, who was accused of espionage by the local branch 
of the FSB, and then escaped from Russia to Ukraine. 
Overall, the Kremlin encouraged its rivals to leave the 
country, rightly considering that beyond Russia’s border 
they would be less dangerous for the regime. Still, the 
number of political prisoners in Russia remained rela-
tively low for a dictatorship: Memorial counted about 
seventy names in late 2013.
By mid-2013, the Kremlin had seemingly mini-
mized the threat from the opposition on the electoral 
front. At best, regime opponents could win individual 
seats in regional legislatures and make no more trouble 
for the Kremlin than the “loyal” systemic parties. But 
these expectations proved to be wrong in the case of the 
Moscow mayoral elections. On the eve of the city’s may-
oral campaign, Navalny, the most popular and capa-
ble leader of the new generation of the opposition, had 
very little support among Moscow voters. The Krem-
lin calculated that a landslide victory in fair elections 
for its candidate would greatly discourage the opposi-
tion, and show voters that there were no viable alterna-
tives to the status quo. Assuming that such an outcome 
was inevitable, Navalny, who was undergoing a crimi-
nal trial during the campaign, was allowed to register 
as a candidate and released from prison the day after 
a court had sentenced him. Apparently, the Kremlin 
wanted to imprison Navalny after the polls, but it under-
estimated his potential; he organized an energetic elec-
toral campaign based around a young, dynamic, and 
creative staff, attracted a large number of devoted vol-
unteers, effectively used crowd-funding techniques, and 
mobilized a sizeable number of voters beyond the oppo-
sition’s core supporters. The election results exceeded 
virtually all predictions: Navalny received more than 
600,000 Muscovite votes. Most probably the Krem-
lin’s strategists deeply regretted their decision to hold 
fair elections instead of adopting the previous prac-
tices of arbitrarily excluding rivals and manipulating 
the results. The outcome of the 2014 mayoral election 
in Novosibirsk was even more stunning: a coalition of 
five opposition candidates threw their support to the 
local Communist leader, Anatoly Lokot, who won the 
race against the incumbent, backed by United Russia. 
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The Kremlin, however, also learned some lessons about 
the risks of letting the opposition compete in electoral 
campaigns and the potential for its unexpected success. 
During the new round of subnational elections in Sep-
tember 2014, the Kremlin corrected its mistakes and 
almost no serious opposition candidates were allowed 
to run anywhere in the country.
The annexation of Crimea marked a new round of 
Kremlin screw tightening. Efforts to publicly discredit 
the opposition in the media became more intense and 
universal, while the politics of fear materialized in the 
more active and systematic harassment of leaders, activ-
ists, and organizations. Navalny (who previously was 
given probation after being found guilty in a manufac-
tured criminal case) was put under house arrest; his right 
hand and fundraiser, Vladimir Ashurkov, was accused 
of criminal wrongdoing and fled the country; and his 
brother was incarcerated for three and a half years, thus 
becoming a kind of hostage. In addition to using the 
media and law enforcement as tools of coercion, vio-
lence against the opposition became more widespread: 
some regime critics were severely beaten by unknown 
mobsters (such as Pskov regional legislator from Yabloko 
Lev Shlosberg, whose whistleblowing about causalities 
among Russian soldiers in the Donbass annoyed the 
Russian authorities). Moreover, in early 2015 a group 
of pro-Kremlin activists and militants announced the 
emergence of Antimaidan, a new GONGO-like orga-
nization, focused on preventing anti-regime mass mobi-
lization through the use of force. In the light of these 
developments, Nemtsov’s assassination may be per-
ceived as a logical extension of what the Russian regime 
achieved vis-à-vis the opposition so far.
The immediate effect of Nemtsov’s murder was quite 
straightforward: the opposition was heavily demoral-
ized, and even though opposition rallies in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg scheduled on 1 March 2015 gathered a 
large number of participants, their purpose in the eyes of 
the broader public shifted to mourning Nemtsov rather 
than promoting anti-regime stances. Overall, this assas-
sination sent a strong warning to elite and middle class 
representatives who may sympathize with the opposition 
that they should abstain from unauthorized and uncon-
ventional political activism. To what extent this message 
will be taken seriously remains to be seen.
It is difficult to judge the degree to which the use 
of political violence against the regime’s opponents will 
become a major Kremlin tool for repressing its rivals 
and society at large. The implementation of a harsh 
coercive strategy is possible (yet not predetermined) if 
the authorities perceive a threat of mass mobilization or 
regime overthrow. In other words, if the Kremlin’s poli-
tics of fear do not achieve their goals, the regime could 
resort to various types of force. But these perceptions 
may be affected by numerous factors which are hardly 
predictable. Authoritarian regimes, including Russia’s, 
often suffer from a lack of correct information about 
the situation in their respective countries. Accordingly, 
their calculus of dissent and choice of coercive strate-
gies may be risky for the rulers themselves. Certainly, 
these developments potentially are even more hazard-
ous for Russian society.
About the Author
Vladimir Gel'man is a professor at European University at St. Petersburg and the University of Helsinki.
Further Readings
Gel'man, Vladimir, 2015, “Political Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Transformation,” Europe-Asia Studies 67 (2): 
177–191.
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 166, 15 April 2015 5
ANALYSIS
An Uphill Battle: Maintaining political Opposition in the Context of 
Russia’s nationalist Turn
By David White, Birmingham
Abstract
In September 2013 Russian political opposition activists in Moscow were basking in the glory of Alexei 
Navalny’s mayoral campaign and discussing what they saw as the very real possibility of taking seats in the 
September 2014 Moscow parliamentary elections. Eighteen months on and in the wake of the ‘nationalist 
turn’ in Russian politics spawned in part by the annexation of Crimea and support for Russian separatists 
in eastern Ukraine, the political conditions in which opposition operates have significantly worsened. This 
article analyses the challenges in mobilising opposition and protest to the Putin regime in the current polit-
ical environment and the options open to opposition activists. Ultimately the most realistic scenario for the 
opposition is simply to stay in existence until more conducive conditions present themselves.
September 2013 marks the highpoint in the for-tunes of political opposition in Russia. In the Mos-
cow mayoral elections the opposition candidate, Alexei 
Navalny, achieved a highly credible 27.9 per cent of the 
vote, almost forcing the incumbent, Sergei Sobyanin 
into a second round. I was in Moscow in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the election to renew acquaintances 
with a number of my contacts in the so-called ‘non-sys-
temic’ opposition, to assess opportunities and to hear 
about future strategies in the light of Navalny’s ‘suc-
cess’. The mood amongst opposition activists, including 
many who had participated in Navalny’s campaign, was 
more buoyant than I had experienced in fifteen years 
of researching political opposition in Russia. There was 
plenty of evidence of Navalny’s campaign as I travelled 
around the capital. A week after the election Navalny’s 
team was still handing out newsletters outside metro sta-
tions and, what’s more, people were going out of their 
way to actually pick them up. Cars bearing Navalny’s 
name on the familiar blue background, echoing the 
placards held aloft by his supporters during the dem-
onstrations in July 2013 following his sentencing for 
alleged embezzlement, were a common sight. I talked 
to one of Navalny’s closest aides in a Vietnamese restau-
rant which appeared to be full of his supporters. Plan-
ning had already started for the Moscow Duma elec-
tions of September 2014. Navalny intended to register 
his own party and agreement was reached with other 
parties and individuals to contest the elections together. 
It might seem like hopeless optimism now but activists 
were talking then about what they saw as the real pos-
sibility of getting their people elected to the Moscow 
Duma, even possibly holding a majority.
Long before the elections of September 2014, how-
ever, Russia’s political landscape looked a very differ-
ent place. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
in March 2014 and the subsequent conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, the distinct nationalist, anti-Western turn in 
Russian politics fostered by the Kremlin’s rhetoric was 
clearly not conducive to an opposition largely comprising 
of pro-democracy, pro-European, pro-Western forces. By 
the summer of 2014 the opposition’s best laid plans for 
competing in the autumn elections had also gone awry. 
One by one the ‘For Moscow’ coalition candidates were 
barred from standing. In March the State Duma passed 
legislation introducing legislation requiring all indepen-
dent candidates to obtain signatures from three percent 
of their constituents in order to compete. For the coali-
tion candidates, who were all standing as independents, 
this meant gathering around 5,000 signatures in thirty 
days. Most were unable to do so and those that man-
aged the task, including Maria Gaidar (daughter of for-
mer Prime Minister, Egor Gaidar) were later prevented 
from standing on the grounds that the electoral com-
mission found that too many of their signatures were 
fraudulent or otherwise inadmissible. Only three can-
didates belonging to the liberal Yabloko party, already 
registered from the previous election, were left stand-
ing. Moreover, the opposition’s talisman, Alexei Navalny, 
was once more under house arrest facing fresh charges. 
Vladmir Ashurkov, one of Navalny’s closest aides, was 
seeking asylum in London having also been charged 
with embezzlement.
How political opposition in Russia is defined needs 
some clarification here. It has become common place 
to think of Russian political opposition as being neatly 
divided into ‘systemic’ and ‘non-systemic’ categories, 
the former being represented by parties in parliament, 
the latter being those excluded from or unable to gain 
entry to the Duma. Such a conceptualisation is increas-
ingly outdated and it makes rather more sense to think 
in terms of systemic parties (those represented in the 
legislature and who all provide a role in sustaining the 
regime) and non-systemic parties (by virtue of not being 
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part of the system, such parties and movements are de 
facto opposition organisations). Opposition politics in 
Russia is therefore much more the politics of the street 
than of the ballot box or legislature. Regardless of the 
setback for the ‘For Moscow’ coalition, a truer indica-
tion of the declining fortunes of political opposition 
came not from an inability to contest elections, opposi-
tion parties in Russia have become accustomed to elec-
toral exclusion, but from dwindling numbers of people 
prepared to take to the streets. The stark fact for Rus-
sian political opposition is that the mobilisation of sup-
porters has become ever more difficult.
Why Aren’t people protesting?
The first thing to explain is that they are, to an extent. 
Around 30,000 people joined an anti-war protest in 
Moscow in September 2014 and regular smaller-scale 
demonstrations and pickets have been held in Moscow 
and other major cities. On 30th December 2014, an esti-
mated 5,000 Muscovites turned out in freezing temper-
atures to protest the sentence handed down to Navalny 
and his brother, Oleg (a suspended sentence for Alexei 
and a two-and-a-half year custodial sentence for Oleg—
the charges are to all intents and purposes, entirely spuri-
ous). These are, however, nothing like the numbers who 
protested in 2011–12 after the parliamentary elections. 
Mobilising large numbers of formerly passive opponents 
to the regime has clearly become a major challenge for 
the opposition—why is this the case?
Change in post-Crimea political Environment?
As noted above, the changing political environment 
in which any critical voices of Russian policy towards 
Ukraine are promptly labelled as Western stooges or 
fifth columnists is clearly a factor. The broad opposi-
tion movement itself is divided over Crimea and the 
actions of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. 
Those on the left, for instance Sergei Udaltsov and Edu-
ard Limonov have expressed support for the annexation 
(or, as they would view it reunification) of Crimea and 
for Russian separatists. Meanwhile the liberals have 
remained implacably opposed to both. Given the con-
sistently high level of support thus far for the Krem-
lin’s Ukrainian policy and the prevalent anti-Western 
and nationalistic mood in society, attempts at mobil-
isation by forces seen as favouring democratic, ‘Euro-
pean’ values have not been met with the kind of positive 
response which, for instance, followed the parliamen-
tary elections in the winter of 2011–12. Anecdotal evi-
dence from discussions with contacts in the opposition 
movement point to a growing disillusionment amongst 
activists faced with problems of mobilising support in 
the current environment.
The Moby Dick scenario?
Writing in the Moscow Times on 4th February, the busi-
nessman and journalist, Lev Kadik addressed the same 
question—why no protests? Was it because Russians 
are effectively slaves asked his European friends. Nei-
ther were they slaves, nor were they poisoned by propa-
ganda, responded Kadik. Instead the Russian people 
had effectively become a Peqoud crew (the Peqoud being 
the whaleship in Melville’s ‘Moby Dick’). In the past, 
ships captains were seen as magicians, only they knew 
how to read maps and use sextants, the poorly paid and 
badly educated sailors had to accept the captain’s will 
and mutinies were rare and very rarely successful. Ordi-
nary sailors didn’t know how to run the ship or where 
to go without their captain—neither, argued Kadik, do 
Russians today. Whatever they may think about their 
President, only he knows how to run the ship. Support 
for Putin and conversely the lack of support for opposi-
tion protest stems from the ‘practical wishes of trapped 
people to stay safe in turbulent times’.
natural part of protest Cycle?
The decrease in street protest activity could be viewed as 
natural part of the protest cycle. As the social movement 
theorist Sidney Tarrow reminds us, we would expect to 
see mobilisation increase at times when the regime shows 
vulnerability and this would, of course, help to explain 
the spike in protest activity in the winter of 2011–12 
following the fraudulent parliamentary elections and at 
a relative low-point in support for Putin. It is certainly 
true that common theme in conversations with opposi-
tion activists is that maintaining high levels of mobili-
sation outside election periods remains their major chal-
lenge and one that has yet to be adequately met.
The influence of Repression on Mobilisation?
Social movement literature points to a correlation 
between levels of repression and mobilisation although 
the linkage is often contradictory. Generally though we 
might expect to find opposition mobilisation increas-
ing at times of lower repression. A number of opposi-
tion activists have suggested to me that we shouldn’t 
underestimate Medvedev’s period as president as a more 
relaxed period where opposition movements were able to 
develop strategy, build coalitions and prepare for action. 
The evidence in the Russian case tends to support the 
argument that increased repression leads to de-mobilisa-
tion. We do not have to search hard for those repressive 
measures during Putin’s third term: the clampdown on 
NGOs; the hounding of key individuals such as Navalny 
and Udaltsov; the continued imprisonment of 4th May 
2012 protesters; and the portrayal of opposition activ-
ists as fifth columnists and so on.
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The long-term success or failure of opposition actions 
is dependent on the mobilisation of large numbers of 
passive opponents of the regime but increased repression 
clearly raises the costs of protest, a dynamic recognised 
by opposition activists. Referring to an earlier round of 
protests in 2010, the activist, Ilya Yashin told me that:
On 23rd October [2010] we had about 1,500 peo-
ple on Pushkin Square for an anti-Putin protest. 
We need more but people are really afraid. We say 
come along, the more there are, the bigger the rally, 
the safer you will be. But they are still not sure.
One cannot discount genuine fear of the consequences 
of taking part in street protest as a major de-mobilising 
factor. Such latent fear can only have been exacerbated 
by the assassination of Boris Nemtsov on 27th Febru-
ary 2015. If such a prominent figure can be targeted in 
this way, the logical thinking may go, then how safe are 
ordinary citizens who take part in protests? Speaking 
at a panel organised by former Finance Minister, Alek-
sei Kudrin’s Civic Initiatives Committee in March 2015, 
the sociologist, Sergei Belanovsky, stated that there was a 
‘new factor of fear’ in Russia and that people were afraid 
to lose what they have. As a result there was, in effect, 
a ‘protest against protests’.
political Opportunities for Opposition 
Mobilisation?
Opposition movements in non-democratic systems the 
world over face the challenge of raising the costs of 
authoritarian rule outside of election periods but the 
post-Crimea political landscape which Russian politi-
cal opposition now finds itself in poses fresh and pos-
sibly insurmountable challenges at least in the short 
to medium term. In these conditions do any political 
opportunities exist for opposition or should activists 
enter a period of enforced hibernation and await more 
conducive conditions?
Ukraine, the impact of sanctions and the Failing 
Economy
The liberal opposition in the form of the Solidarity 
movement, Yabloko, Navalny’s Progress Party and the 
Party of People’s Freedom (RPR-PARNAS) have con-
sistently opposed the Kremlin’s Ukrainian policy and 
have had limited success in mobilising support for anti-
war demonstrations. However, as noted above, the lev-
els of support for the annexation of Crimea coupled 
with growing levels of anti-Western sentiment suggest 
this is not much of an opportunity at all. Some activists 
have talked about how the effect of sanctions may lead 
to declining levels of support for the regime but as long 
as the West is perceived as the villain, the appeal of a 
European-looking opposition appears to remain limited. 
How stable though is support for the Kremlin’s policy 
towards Ukraine? Mikhail Dmitriyev, head of the Mos-
cow-based Centre for Strategic Research think tank and 
a member of Kudrin’s committee has argued that sup-
port for Putin has always been linked to how people felt 
about the economy. As pubic faith in the economy has 
declined Putin has had to rely on his stance on Ukraine 
and the demonization of the West over sanctions in 
order to maintain high levels of support for the regime. 
Should the ‘Ukraine factor’ fade away or if the conflict 
becomes ‘frozen’, argues Dmitriyev, we may see Putin’s 
ratings decline sharply bringing it into line with atti-
tudes towards the economy. Such a shift in the political 
environment may, in turn, present political opposition 
with an opportunity to challenge a weakened regime.
Unity of Opposition—the Key Variable
These are undoubtedly difficult times for political oppo-
sition in Russia and unity is going to be a clear challenge. 
As scholars such as Alfred Stepan and Marc Morjé How-
ard and Philip Roessler have argued, unity, and specif-
ically the ability to create and maintain broad opposi-
tion coalitions is a key variable in successful opposition 
challenges to a non-democratic regime. Thus far Rus-
sian political opposition, by focusing on procedure rather 
than policy, has maintained a surprisingly high degree of 
unity. It used to be common at protests and demonstra-
tions to see the liberals, Ilya Yashin and Boris Nemtsov 
together with the communist, Sergei Udaltsov, and the 
liberal-nationalist, Aleksei Navalny.
The coalition of liberal opposition appears to be 
holding together despite a history of fractious relations 
between the social and economic liberal tendencies. 
Boris Nemtsov had been attempting to launch a formal 
coalition to be known as ‘European Choice’ (possibly not 
the most appealing of names given the current ant-West-
ern hysteria in Russia). At the beginning of April 2015 
opposition leaders (including Alexei Navalny, Mikhail 
Kasyanov and Vladimir Ryzhkov of RPR-PARNAS, 
the Just Russia deputy, Dmitry Gudkov, former econ-
omy minister in Gaidar’s government, Andrei Nechayev, 
and leader of the Democratic Choice party, Vladimir 
Milov) reached a tentative agreement to field candidates 
on a single ticket for the 2016 parliamentary elections. 
However, in order to comply with Russian electoral leg-
islation they will have to compete as a single party. In 
the past the challenge of dissolving the myriad of oppo-
sition parties and creating a single and united liberal-
democratic party has proved too great, such initiatives 
breaking down over ideological and programmatic dif-
ferences and clashes of personality. Speaking after the 
meeting Dmitry Gudkov hoped that other opposition 
forces, particularly the Yabloko party would join the new 
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initiative. To bring Yabloko, Russia’s longest established 
liberal party, on board would be something of a coup 
although in the past the party’s leadership has strenu-
ously resisted such moves.
Conclusion
As Andreas Schedler reminds us, electoral authoritar-
ianism, whilst built to withstand transformation, is 
not entirely impervious to an effective opposition chal-
lenge. The electoral component can and has facilitated 
successful challenges to such regime. Similarly, Larry 
Diamond points to potential opposition openings in 
hybrid regimes. Opposition breakthroughs are possible 
but require “a level of opposition mobilisation, unity and 
skill, and heroism”, way beyond what would be required 
to bring about change in a consolidated democracy.
Unity has been something of an issue for political 
opposition forces in Russia, particularly amongst the lib-
eral-democratic forces but the post-election protests of 
2011–12 did, however, see a greater degree of collabora-
tion amongst opposition forces, a trend which appears to 
be still in place, evidenced by the latest coming together 
of liberal-democratic forces.
The mayoral campaign of 2013 was certainly skilful 
and, in Aleksei Navalny, the Russian political opposi-
tion has a charismatic and heroic leader who, despite lin-
gering concerns about his sometimes overtly nationalist 
stance, might be seen as a fresh alternative, not tainted 
with the mistakes of the past.
However, the mobilisation referred to by Diamond 
remains the main challenge for Russian political oppo-
sition. Through mobilising civil society by capitalising 
on widespread discontent with the conduct of the 2011 
parliamentary elections, political opposition proved that 
it was able to raise the costs of authoritarian rule.
A greater challenge, and one acknowledged by politi-
cal opposition actor is to achieve similar levels of mobil-
isation outside the election period. In the post-Crimea 
landscape political opportunities are likely to be few 
and far between.
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OpINION pOLL
“Does Russia need An Opposition?” 
Results of Representative polls of the Russian population conducted by levada Center
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center May 2004 – February 2015; N (for polls of 20–23 February 2015) = 1600. Pub-
lished on 27 February 2015 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/27-02-2015/neobkhodimost-politicheskoi-oppozitsii-i-podderzhka-
oppozitsionnykh-trebovanii>
Figure 1: is There A political Opposition in Russia?
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Figure 2: Does Russia need A political Opposition?
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Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center May 2004 – February 2015; N (for polls of 20–23 February 2015) = 1600. Pub-
lished on 27 February 2015 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/27-02-2015/neobkhodimost-politicheskoi-oppozitsii-i-podderzhka-
oppozitsionnykh-trebovanii>
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Figure 3: Do you sympathize With the leaders of the “non-systemic Opposition”, such As 
Mikhail Kasyanov, Boris nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Alexei navalnyi, and Others?
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Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center December 2011 – February 2015; N (for polls of 20–23 February 2015) = 1600. 
Published on 27 February 2015 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/27-02-2015/neobkhodimost-politicheskoi-oppozitsii-i-podderzh 
ka-oppozitsionnykh-trebovanii>
Figure 4: some people believe that street rallies and demonstrations are a normal democratic 
means to express citizens’ positions and the authorities have no right to prohibit them. 
Others think that street rallies and demonstrations are an instrument to destabilize 
order in the country and should be prohibited. Which of these points of view is closer 
to your opinion?
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center May 2008 – February 2015; N (for polls of 20–23 February 2015) = 1600. Pub-
lished on 27 February 2015 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/27-02-2015/neobkhodimost-politicheskoi-oppozitsii-i-podderzhka-
oppozitsionnykh-trebovanii>
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